TY - UNPB
T1 - Can Media Act as a Soft Regulator of Safe AI Development?
T2 - A Game Theoretical Analysis
AU - da Fonseca, Henrique Correia
AU - Fernandes, António
AU - Song, Zhao
AU - Cimpeanu, Theodor
AU - Balabanova, Nataliya
AU - Bashir, Adeela
AU - Bova, Paolo
AU - Buscemi, Alessio
AU - Stefano, Alessandro Di
AU - Duong, Manh Hong
AU - Domingos, Elias Fernandez
AU - Ogbo, Ndidi Bianca
AU - Powers, Simon T.
AU - Proverbio, Daniele
AU - Shamszaman, Zia Ush
AU - Santos, Fernando P.
AU - Han, The Anh
AU - Krellner, Marcus
N1 - 10 Pages, 7 Figures, accepted in the ALIFE 2025 Conference
PY - 2025/9/2
Y1 - 2025/9/2
N2 - When developers of artificial intelligence (AI) products need to decide between profit and safety for the users, they likely choose profit. Untrustworthy AI technology must come packaged with tangible negative consequences. Here, we envisage those consequences as the loss of reputation caused by media coverage of their misdeeds, disseminated to the public. We explore whether media coverage has the potential to push AI creators into the production of safe products, enabling widespread adoption of AI technology. We created artificial populations of self-interested creators and users and studied them through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Our results reveal that media is indeed able to foster cooperation between creators and users, but not always. Cooperation does not evolve if the quality of the information provided by the media is not reliable enough, or if the costs of either accessing media or ensuring safety are too high. By shaping public perception and holding developers accountable, media emerges as a powerful soft regulator -- guiding AI safety even in the absence of formal government oversight.
AB - When developers of artificial intelligence (AI) products need to decide between profit and safety for the users, they likely choose profit. Untrustworthy AI technology must come packaged with tangible negative consequences. Here, we envisage those consequences as the loss of reputation caused by media coverage of their misdeeds, disseminated to the public. We explore whether media coverage has the potential to push AI creators into the production of safe products, enabling widespread adoption of AI technology. We created artificial populations of self-interested creators and users and studied them through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Our results reveal that media is indeed able to foster cooperation between creators and users, but not always. Cooperation does not evolve if the quality of the information provided by the media is not reliable enough, or if the costs of either accessing media or ensuring safety are too high. By shaping public perception and holding developers accountable, media emerges as a powerful soft regulator -- guiding AI safety even in the absence of formal government oversight.
U2 - 10.48550/arXiv.2509.02650
DO - 10.48550/arXiv.2509.02650
M3 - Preprint
BT - Can Media Act as a Soft Regulator of Safe AI Development?
PB - arXiv
ER -