Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations

David Catteeuw, Bernard Manderick, The Anh Han

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    2 Citations (Scopus)


    We study honest signaling in the Philip Sidney game. Until now, researchers concentrated on verifying under what circumstances honest signaling is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Whereas the concept of ESS assumes infinite populations, we analyze here, for the first time, the more realistic scenario where populations are finite-which allows us to study the effect of varying the population size with respect to the viability of honest signaling. We show that honest signaling is much less frequent than previously observed within the infinite population setting. We observe that population size has a similar effect as selection pressure, namely, the larger the population the more important the difference in fitness between the strategies. Our experiments reveal, furthermore, that evolutionary stability is not very predictive for the viability of honest signaling. Most surprisingly, we found cases where honest signaling is the most prevalent strategy but not evolutionarily stable.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2013
    Number of pages7
    Publication statusPublished - 21 Aug 2013
    Event2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation - Cancun, Mexico
    Duration: 20 Jun 201323 Jun 2013


    Conference2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
    Abbreviated titleCEC 2013


    Dive into the research topics of 'Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this