Good agreements make good friends

The Anh Han, Luis Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos, Tom Lenaerts

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When starting a new collaborative endeavor, it pays to establish upfront how strongly your partner commits to the common goal and what compensation can be expected in case the collaboration is violated. Diverse examples in biological and social contexts have demonstrated the pervasiveness of making prior agreements on posterior compensations, suggesting that this behavior could have been shaped by natural selection. Here, we analyze the evolutionary relevance of such a commitment strategy and relate it to the costly punishment strategy, where no prior agreements are made. We show that when the cost of arranging a commitment deal lies within certain limits, substantial levels of cooperation can be achieved. Moreover, these levels are higher than that achieved by simple costly punishment, especially when one insists on sharing the arrangement cost. Not only do we show that good agreements make good friends, agreements based on shared costs result in even better outcomes.

Original languageEnglish
Article number2695
JournalScientific Reports
Volume3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 18 Sep 2013

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Punishment
Compensation and Redress
Cost Sharing
Costs and Cost Analysis
Genetic Selection

Cite this

Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2013). Good agreements make good friends. Scientific Reports, 3, [2695]. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep02695
Han, The Anh ; Pereira, Luis Moniz ; Santos, Francisco C. ; Lenaerts, Tom. / Good agreements make good friends. In: Scientific Reports. 2013 ; Vol. 3.
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Han, TA, Pereira, LM, Santos, FC & Lenaerts, T 2013, 'Good agreements make good friends', Scientific Reports, vol. 3, 2695. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep02695

Good agreements make good friends. / Han, The Anh; Pereira, Luis Moniz; Santos, Francisco C.; Lenaerts, Tom.

In: Scientific Reports, Vol. 3, 2695, 18.09.2013.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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Han TA, Pereira LM, Santos FC, Lenaerts T. Good agreements make good friends. Scientific Reports. 2013 Sep 18;3. 2695. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep02695