Intention recognition, commitment and the evolution of cooperation

The Anh Han; Luís Moniz Pereira; Francisco C. Santos

doi:10.1109/CEC.2012.6256472

Intention recognition, commitment and the evolution of cooperation

The Anh Han, Luís Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may depend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the agent's best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accurate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the evolution of cooperative behavior. We resort to tools of evolutionary game theory in finite populations, showing how the combination of these two aspects of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts under a broad spectrum of configurations.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012
Publisher	IEEE
ISBN (Print)	9781467315098
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2012.6256472
Publication status	Published - 4 Oct 2012
Event	2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation - Brisbane, Australia Duration: 10 Jun 2012 → 15 Jun 2012

Publication series

Name	2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012

Conference

Conference	2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
Abbreviated title	CEC 2012
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Brisbane
Period	10/06/12 → 15/06/12

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10.1109/CEC.2012.6256472

Cite this

@inproceedings{600322af59984232b6a91b32fd2ca0cc,

title = "Intention recognition, commitment and the evolution of cooperation",

abstract = "Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may depend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the agent's best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accurate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the evolution of cooperative behavior. We resort to tools of evolutionary game theory in finite populations, showing how the combination of these two aspects of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts under a broad spectrum of configurations.",

author = "Han, {The Anh} and Pereira, {Lu{\'i}s Moniz} and Santos, {Francisco C.}",

year = "2012",

month = oct,

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doi = "10.1109/CEC.2012.6256472",

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series = "2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012",

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booktitle = "2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012",

note = "2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012 ; Conference date: 10-06-2012 Through 15-06-2012",

}

Han, TA, Pereira, LM & Santos, FC 2012, Intention recognition, commitment and the evolution of cooperation. in 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012., 6256472, 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012, IEEE, 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, 10/06/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2012.6256472

TY - GEN

T1 - Intention recognition, commitment and the evolution of cooperation

AU - Han, The Anh

AU - Pereira, Luís Moniz

AU - Santos, Francisco C.

PY - 2012/10/4

Y1 - 2012/10/4

N2 - Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may depend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the agent's best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accurate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the evolution of cooperative behavior. We resort to tools of evolutionary game theory in finite populations, showing how the combination of these two aspects of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts under a broad spectrum of configurations.

AB - Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may depend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the agent's best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accurate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the evolution of cooperative behavior. We resort to tools of evolutionary game theory in finite populations, showing how the combination of these two aspects of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts under a broad spectrum of configurations.

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M3 - Conference contribution

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SN - 9781467315098

T3 - 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012

BT - 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2012

PB - IEEE

T2 - 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation

Y2 - 10 June 2012 through 15 June 2012

ER -

Intention recognition, commitment and the evolution of cooperation

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