Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation

Annamaria Kovacs; Ulrich Meyer; Carmine Ventre

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6

Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation

Annamaria Kovacs, Ulrich Meyer, Carmine Ventre

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Abstract

Novel algorithmic ideas for big data have not been accompa- nied by advances in the way central memory is allocated to concurrently running programs. Commonly, RAM is poorly managed since the pro- grams' trade o s between speed of execution and RAM consumption are ignored. This trade o is, however, well known to the programmers. We adopt mechanism design tools to truthfully elicit this (multidimensional) information with the aim of designing more clever RAM allocation al- gorithms. We introduce a novel paradigm wherein programs are bound to overbidding declarations of their running times. We show the limi- tations of this paradigm in the absence of transfers and prove how to leverage waiting times, as a currency, to obtain optimal money burning mechanisms for the makespan.

Original language	English
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6
Publication status	Published - 9 Dec 2015
Event	11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics - CWI Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands Duration: 9 Dec 2015 → 12 Dec 2015

Conference

Conference	11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics
Abbreviated title	WINE 2015
Country/Territory	Netherlands
City	Amsterdam
Period	9/12/15 → 12/12/15

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Full textFinal published version, 295 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

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AU - Kovacs, Annamaria

AU - Meyer, Ulrich

AU - Ventre, Carmine

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AB - Novel algorithmic ideas for big data have not been accompa- nied by advances in the way central memory is allocated to concurrently running programs. Commonly, RAM is poorly managed since the pro- grams' trade o s between speed of execution and RAM consumption are ignored. This trade o is, however, well known to the programmers. We adopt mechanism design tools to truthfully elicit this (multidimensional) information with the aim of designing more clever RAM allocation al- gorithms. We introduce a novel paradigm wherein programs are bound to overbidding declarations of their running times. We show the limi- tations of this paradigm in the absence of transfers and prove how to leverage waiting times, as a currency, to obtain optimal money burning mechanisms for the makespan.

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M3 - Paper

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ER -

Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation

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