My Body, My Pride: Autonomy Revolution v Paternalistic Restraints

Body mutilation and modification encompass deliberate alterations of the human body driven by societal, religious, or aesthetic motives. This longstanding practice has witnessed a recent upsurge in non-therapeutic mutilation and extreme body modification. Technological advancements and other factors have contributed to an unprecedented level of individualization of the body in the past decade. Notably, procedures such as 'split lizard tongues,' 'tattooed eyeballs,' 'genital beading,' and 'ear shaping' have become increasingly prevalent, influenced by considerations of aesthetics, sexual appeal, and social dynamics. This paper examines the impact of legal frameworks and court decisions, with a focus on R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 [HL] and R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560, and draws on the theoretical frameworks of paternalism, legal moralism, and autonomy. It analyzes the implications of these theoretical constructs, legislative frameworks, and court decisions in the context of extreme body modification. The paper argues that an emphasis on paternalism and legal moralism undermines personal autonomy, contradicting the principles of Millian autonomy theory. Considering criticisms and justifications for paternalistic legislation on non-therapeutic mutilation and extreme body modification, the paper recommends law reform and the application of the harm principle to preserve personal liberty and autonomy. It proposes the adoption of soft paternalistic approaches, such as nudging and choice architecture, broadening of restricted categories in R V Brown, inter alia as alternatives to paternalistic measures. Ultimately, the paper concludes that, in accordance with Millian harm theory, personal autonomy must not be impeded by paternalism and legal moralism.