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Abstract
Understanding the evolutionary origins of altruistic punishment, a critical mechanism sustaining cooperation, remains a central challenge in behavioural science. Voluntary participation is considered a powerful approach that enables its emergence, but its explanatory power typically rests on the common assumption that non-participants have no impact on the public good. Yet, given the decentralized nature of voluntary participation, opting out does not necessarily preclude individuals from influencing the public good. Here, we revisit the role of voluntary participation by allowing non-participants to exert either positive or negative impacts on the public good. Using evolutionary analysis in a well-mixed finite population, we find that positive externalities from non-participants lower the synergy threshold required for altruistic punishment to dominate. In contrast, negative externalities raise this threshold, making altruistic punishment harder to sustain. Notably, when non-participants have positive impacts, altruistic punishment thrives only if non-participation is incentivized, whereas under negative impacts, it can persist even when non-participation is discouraged. Our findings reveal that efforts to promote altruistic punishment must account for the active role of non-participants, whose influence can make or break collective outcomes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of the Royal Society, Interface |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 235 |
| Early online date | 18 Feb 2026 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 18 Feb 2026 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2026 The Authors.
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EPSRC standard grant "Evolutionary Game Theory Under Uncertainty"
Han, T. A. (PI)
29/04/24 → 28/04/27
Project: Research
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