Promoting Fair Proposers, Fair Responders or Both? Cost-Efficient Interference in the Spatial Ultimatum Game

Institutions and investors face the constant challenge of makingaccurate decisions and predictions regarding how best they shoulddistribute their endowments. The problem of achieving an opti-mal outcome at minimal cost has been extensively studied andresolved using several heuristics. However, these works fail to ad-dress how an external decision maker can target different types offair behaviour and how limited information can shape this complexinterplay. Here, we consider the well-known Ultimatum game in aspatial setting and propose a hierarchy of interference mechanismsbased on the amount of information available to the external de-cision maker and desired standards of fairness. Our key findingsshow that asymmetric interactions have drastically different dy-namics when compared to symmetric games, such as the Prisoner’sDilemma, and discuss why gathering information about the agents’behaviour allows for the most efficient investment strategies