Projects per year
Institutions and investors face the constant challenge of makingaccurate decisions and predictions regarding how best they shoulddistribute their endowments. The problem of achieving an opti-mal outcome at minimal cost has been extensively studied andresolved using several heuristics. However, these works fail to ad-dress how an external decision maker can target different types offair behaviour and how limited information can shape this complexinterplay. Here, we consider the well-known Ultimatum game in aspatial setting and propose a hierarchy of interference mechanismsbased on the amount of information available to the external de-cision maker and desired standards of fairness. Our key findingsshow that asymmetric interactions have drastically different dy-namics when compared to symmetric games, such as the Prisoner’sDilemma, and discuss why gathering information about the agents’behaviour allows for the most efficient investment strategies
|Title of host publication||aamas|
|Publication status||Accepted/In press - 20 Jan 2021|
|Event||20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Online event|
Duration: 3 May 2021 → 7 May 2021
|Conference||20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems|
|Abbreviated title||AAMAS 2021|
|Period||3/05/21 → 7/05/21|
FingerprintDive into the research topics of 'Promoting Fair Proposers, Fair Responders or Both? Cost-Efficient Interference in the Spatial Ultimatum Game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
- 2 Finished
Leverhulme Research Fellowship: "Incentives for Commitment Compliance"
12/12/20 → 5/12/22
Future of Life Institute Safety Grant "Incentives for Safety Agreement Compliance in AI Race"
30/11/18 → 31/10/20