TY - JOUR
T1 - The evolutionary advantage of guilt
T2 - Co-evolution of social and non-social guilt in structured populations
AU - Cimpeanu, Theodor
AU - Pereira, Luis Moniz
AU - Han, The Anh
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Authors.
PY - 2025/7/30
Y1 - 2025/7/30
N2 - Building ethical machines may involve bestowing upon them the emotional capacity to self-evaluate and repent for their actions. While apologies represent potential strategic interactions, the explicit evolution of guilt as a behavioural trait remains poorly understood. Our study delves into the co-evolution of two forms of emotional guilt: social guilt entails a cost, requiring agents to exert efforts to understand others' internal states and behaviours; and non-social guilt, which only involves awareness of one's own state, incurs no social cost. Resorting to methods from evolutionary game theory, we study analytically, and through extensive numerical and agent-based simulations, whether and how guilt can evolve and deploy, depending on the underlying structure of the systems of agents. Our findings reveal that in lattice and scale-free networks, strategies favouring emotional guilt dominate a broader range of guilt and social costs compared to non-structured well-mixed populations, leading to higher levels of cooperation. In structured populations, both social and non-social guilt can thrive through clustering with emotionally inclined strategies, thereby providing protection against exploiters, particularly for less costly non-social strategies. These insights shed light on the complex interplay of guilt and cooperation, enhancing our understanding of ethical artificial intelligence.
AB - Building ethical machines may involve bestowing upon them the emotional capacity to self-evaluate and repent for their actions. While apologies represent potential strategic interactions, the explicit evolution of guilt as a behavioural trait remains poorly understood. Our study delves into the co-evolution of two forms of emotional guilt: social guilt entails a cost, requiring agents to exert efforts to understand others' internal states and behaviours; and non-social guilt, which only involves awareness of one's own state, incurs no social cost. Resorting to methods from evolutionary game theory, we study analytically, and through extensive numerical and agent-based simulations, whether and how guilt can evolve and deploy, depending on the underlying structure of the systems of agents. Our findings reveal that in lattice and scale-free networks, strategies favouring emotional guilt dominate a broader range of guilt and social costs compared to non-structured well-mixed populations, leading to higher levels of cooperation. In structured populations, both social and non-social guilt can thrive through clustering with emotionally inclined strategies, thereby providing protection against exploiters, particularly for less costly non-social strategies. These insights shed light on the complex interplay of guilt and cooperation, enhancing our understanding of ethical artificial intelligence.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105012289593
U2 - 10.1098/rsif.2025.0164
DO - 10.1098/rsif.2025.0164
M3 - Article
C2 - 40735827
AN - SCOPUS:105012289593
SN - 1742-5689
VL - 22
JO - Journal of the Royal Society Interface
JF - Journal of the Royal Society Interface
IS - 228
M1 - 20250164
ER -