CHAPTER 2
Moral Economy: exploring a contested concept

Abstract: The intellectual resources on morality assembled in the previous chapter contribute to and facilitate the task of refining the conceptual device of moral economy. Accordingly, I now proceed from a preparatory discussion on the subject of morality, to the specifics of moral economy. It is urgent and vital to advance thinking on the content of, arguments for, the mode of conceptualisation and articulation of what is a contested concept. I also begin to weave moral economy with criminal justice and probation.

From intellectual resources to the specifics of moral economy
The previous chapter assembled some of the multi-layered intellectual resources to excavate the concept of the moral. This enquiry was funneled to explore pertinent references to moral economy in the literature and the nature of its existence before and after the great transformation. The next step narrows the focus further by confirming that ethics is the philosophical study of moral questions, and the term ethics and morality have been used interchangeably in the previous chapter. Moral philosophers have reflected on the telos (τελός end) of morality, an exemplar being the aforementioned good life in Aristotle’s (2000) Nicomachean Ethics. Additionally, ethical systems address intrinsic worth and value. Arguably, neoliberal capitalism constitutes a politico-economic and ethical system concerned with the end of human existence. Here, the good life is premised upon the pursuit of personal gain from which everyone in the polis (πόλις) benefits as material wealth trickles down. The doctrinal creed is that greed, egoistically pursued, is so good that it results in beneficence for all. The verifiable and experiential flaw with this model is that how capitalism is supposed to work is not, in fact, how it does work. The evidence from Piketty’s (2014) monumental edifice that draws on extensive historical and comparative data sources on capitalist organisation is that it demonstrably sucks-up wealth more than it cascades down, and self-interest is self-evidently not converted into benevolence. Let’s not be churlish and give credit where it’s due by acknowledging its exemplary capacity to create material wealth, but the system cannot guarantee that wealth is acquired fairly or distributed equitably. Material benefits come at the expense of socio-economic inequality that inflicts damage on all of us (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). The material surface that shimmers with its tantalising promise of fiscal bliss masks an underbelly of disturbing unethical outcomes. I refer to capitalist organisation to make the case that it is conceptually, materially, and ethically different to the substance of moral economy, my primary concern. Marquand (2014) has a different take on the matter, which I dispute, because he employs the concept in looser fashion to argue that British history, over the last 200 years, has manifested four different moral economies. First, the period before the great transformation when moral economy was the ideological property of the crowd (Thompson, 1971); second, 19th century laissez-faire liberal capitalism; third, Keynesian social democracy that established the social-welfare state from 1945 until the late-
1970s. Finally, the neoliberal era since the 1980s that constitutes the historical parameter for the re-framing of criminal justice in chapters 3 and 4.

This is not my usage because the operational circuits of capital accumulation and market expansion compete with the circuits of ethico-cultural contestation to produce different conditions of existence and individual subjectivity. Capitalist exchange relations, the extraction of time and resources from minds and bodies, exploitation, barbaric and violent competition between individuals and nations, are fixed in mortal combat with a moral economy of regard for others, the common welfare, and equality. A system where it is more blessed to receive than to give (exchange relations) is diametrically opposed to a system where it is more blessed to give than receive. Both have their historical progenitors, ends and aspirations, ways of organising and prioritising life in the polis, operating circuits and mechanisms of reproduction that have determinative anthropological and social implications. Capitalist political economy is a class project played out through markets, capital flows, investment opportunities, profit, self-interest and fearful competition, a free for all of un-freedom exemplified by the unequal distribution of material resources and life opportunities. It privatizes state assets, liberalises global trade, deregulates financial institutions and labour, commercialises human life. It is by nature predatory (Galbraith, 2008), taking out more than it puts in. Since its revival in the neoliberal 1980s and paradoxically, but not unexpectedly, the great leap forward after the capitalist tremours of 2007/08, it inflicts social murder (Chernomas and Hudson, 2007), exacerbates social inequality which is a ‘fundamental feature of capitalism generally, [whose] reproduction is part of the logic of this system’ (Duménil and Lévy, 2004: 137).

Accordingly, my main concern, informed by the cast of resources in chapter 1, is to direct attention to the content of, argument for, the mode of conceptualisation and articulation of moral economy. I advance the position that moral economy functions as a conceptual device to forge links with, and put into sharp relief, the probation ideal and rehabilitative ethic in the criminal justice system which have been systematically dismantled through the politics of disavowal over recent decades. It also demonstrates, during the next two chapters, that the period before the 1980s was different to what followed. It is evidentially the case that ‘They did things differently then, and thought and felt differently’ (Burrow, 2009: 115). The conceptual lens of moral economy folds into the Weberian ideal type, a methodological procedure that compensates for investigative limitations in the social sciences. If social phenomena are ambiguous and cannot be observed directly, the ideal type is constructed to discover the relevant properties of what is subjected to investigation. Moral economy, as conceptual device or ideal type, accentuates certain features of reality. In other words, it is a caricature related to reality, but not its exact representation. Consequently, it functions as a heuristic device, it is elucidatory, identifies traits, advances comparative analysis and can be put to work to expose intellectual and moral deficiency.

Building Content

The concept of moral economy is indubitably complex, contested, and ambiguous, but not insignificant. The following sketch may be disposed of as too speculative and theoretically abstract, with little prospect of implementation in the near or distant future. In other words, it is too Platonically metaphysical to be of any Aristotelian earthly good. Nevertheless, it is a concept requiring careful consideration. The starting point for this reconstruction is that the
foundational content of moral economy asserts the unconditional value of human existence. Schweitzer’s anthropological ethic advanced a life-view where the primary principle of the moral is reverence for life. Its inviolable and personal nature is in and of itself self-sufficiently and self-evidently good. This is the platform upon which to conduct human relations, its sphere of interest encapsulating just and right dealings within the organisation of the polis. It is a life-view with micro (individual subjectivity), mezzo (organisational) and macro (political economy) dimensions. Its content can be further enriched by the Kantian kingdom of ends, not calculable means; Weberian substantive rationality, not instrumental rationality as the motivation for social action; benevolence is valued more highly than egoistic self-interest. This requires a decisive yet difficult move from the self to the other to establish intersubjective social relations of mutuality, empathy, and trust. When Schweitzer issued the invitation in the aftermath of the First World War to ‘look for a human being or some work devoted to human welfare’ (1929: 260), it was not possible for everyone to emulate Bonhoeffer in activating an ethical injunction that sacrificially cost his life. However, social workers, probation officers, and others employed in the people-facing professions assimilated this ethical rationality within their respective organisations. Probation work, within the criminal justice system, was an integral component of the post-war Keynesian settlement (Skidelsky, 2003) as a public good, delivering a public service, as a public duty, largely to a disadvantaged section of the public. It belonged to the personal social services that operationalised a personalist ethic until, that is, the profession was trashed by the politics of New Public Management and its supporting musculature of managerial consultants. Probation’s pioneering mission constructed structural, cultural, and biographical analyses of the human condition to understand and explain offending behaviour, an intellectual and moral task on behalf of the state and criminal justice system.

Schweitzer and Bonhoeffer on civilization and philosophical ethics, Küngian theology and Christology, Pauline epistolary resources appertaining to political ethics, the Judaeo-Christian inheritance, entreaties on personalism and the Symbolic order, assert the ethico-cultural significance of being men and women for others as the definitive norm of responsibility and maturity. This requires a transformed politico-ethical order that eradicates socially constructed binaries. It is committed to agapē (ἀγάπη), a veritable scandal because it represents a radical challenge to the organisation of life immersed in self-interest, extracting from others to advance the self. The content of moral economy is enriched by Badiou’s references to Abrahamic and Pauline exemplars where equality constitutes a material sign of the universal. Indubitably all citizens in the polis matter and socially constructed binary distinctions, the extreme differential allocation of material resources, the signs and symbols of material success and status, must be transcended. Transcendence is achieved through commitment to a higher unity that for some is the theologian’s God, or Other. For others a Symbolic order, or Big Other, that fashions a subjectivity different to that required by the capitalist system. Moral economy makes demands, requires existential choices, and is sacrificially costly in human resources and time. It functions within the circuits of a value system where it is preferable to give than receive, agapē not exchange relations, where humanity is one and not divided by the cult of narcissistic hyper-individualism. It is in marked contrast to politico-economic and social organisation that favour an elite who acquire a surfeit of power and material resources, wielded over others to maintain and reproduce a competitive advantage. Its symbol is a sacrificial and renunciating cross (σταυρός), not the semiotics of material excess so highly prized by consumer culture and its media outlets. It is
dialogic, face-to-face not in your face, and it is as absurd and scandalous as unorthodox. It
cuts against the grain by challenging the way the world is in arguing for justice (δικαιοσύνη),
fairness, equality, and the virtues of moral excellence and goodness. Moral economy is
preoccupied with the requisite content to further the good life in the polis.

James Joyce (see Kiberd, 2009), as literary artist, conveyed the moral vision in Ulysses that
public spaces, the streets where people come into contact with each other, teach social
relations. During the early 20th century Joyce was aware of much wrongdoing - Dublin
subjected to the imperial yoke of the British Empire, the baleful influence of the Roman
Catholic Church from birth to death, Irish and Jews as hated peoples, the great weight of
history pressing down with force, hatred, racism and bigotry. These were not the components
of agapē (ἀγάπη), this was not life, yet ‘Growth is possible, even for settled citizens like Bloom,
through openness to the Other, a willingness to talk with those who might seem different’
(2009: 246). Similarly, for George Eliot in Middlemarch, human relationships are
unquestionably complex but if taken seriously they come with the invitation to grow beyond
self-centeredness: ‘If I really care for you – if I try to think myself into your position and
orientation – then the world is bettered by my effort at understanding and comprehension’
(Mead, 2014: 223 – the social worker’s and probation officer’s creed). Empathy and
imaginative understanding attenuate egoism, so that human growth is possible through
openness to others, in taking the step from self to other, from the closed world of the ego to
inter-subjective relations. It is the leap from darkness to light, nature to culture, the fusion of
imaginary and symbolic, resonating with the injunction that in order to find oneself one must
lose oneself in the Ethical Life. Moral economy is doing good not evil, it strengthens the
fainthearted, supports the weak, helps the afflicted; it is agapē, service, and the capacity for
self-sacrifice. Although human beings act from questionable motives, we are nevertheless
capable of sympathy, benevolence, and, as Adam Smith deduced, show an interest in the
fortune of others (1759/2009: 13). Not to do this is a persistent threat to the stability of the
socio-moral order.

To repeat, the concept of moral economy is complex and contested. It is enshrouded in
ambiguity and ambivalence, and some might say irrelevance. However, it is not insignificant
because, historically and culturally, it informed the work of the criminal justice system
through the probation ideal. Probation, from its statutory beginnings during the early 20th
century, has performed tasks on behalf of the state whilst operating with a measure of
organisational independence until, that is, relatively recently. Its rationale, although
containing a mélange of competing ideological perspectives (see Whitehead, 2010 on various
models of practice), exemplified a humane approach to understanding the biological,
psychological, and sociological correlates of offending behaviour. It was also, at its very best,
a humanising influence throughout the whole system. Probation officers responded to
Schweitzer’s advice to find vocational work to facilitate human welfare through which they
could make a difference as well as make a living. They understood something of and practiced
reverence for life (towards offenders, victims and local communities), criminal and social
justice. They implemented a life-view that blended cognitive insight with empathic sensibility,
professional duty to the courts and passion for the job conducted through relationships that
combined the professional and personal. Moral economy is not identical to the probation
ideal, but functions as a conceptual device to bring into view a moral dimension to probation
practice expressed in the terminology of the rehabilitative ethic. So a trinity of overlapping
components: an intellectually supportive moral economy; the probation ideal; and rehabilitative ethic (see extended discussion in Whitehead, 2010: 65-81 for these archaeological deposits). The central features of the probation ideal were as follows:

- Informed by religious, humanitarian and personalist impulses that combined to humanise the criminal justice system.
- Utilised the human sciences, from psychology to criminology and social theory, to excavate the aetiology of complex behavioural patterns. Understanding incorporated both *what* and *why* dimensions (*what* have you done and *why* have you done it?) to explain offending to magistrates and judges by taking account of structural, cultural, and biographical variables (Whitehead and Thompson, 2004).
- From a Joycean perspective the probation ideal involved openness to the other and a curiosity about behavioural repertoires. It concurred with George Eliot that the world can be a better place by understanding and comprehension, which was the function of the Social Enquiry Report to advance.
- The probation ideal supported a constructive and educative approach in the community wherever possible, which symbolised something more positive than punishment and prison. It was part of the personal social work services, not retributive punishment.
- Operated with a narrative of tolerance, human decency, caring control and compassion, empathy, support and help which was its vocational public duty.
- Believed that people can change and so did not give up on others. Relationships were at the centre of practice – good and right in themselves, and effective. Maruna (2001) asserted that offenders can be immersed into a new symbolic order through metanoia (*μετανοια* as a change of heart and mind).
- It explicated that probation officers were the social workers of the criminal and civil courts, therefore different to other staff within the organisations of criminal justice.
- The probation ideal included intellectual curiosity and moral obligation, qualitative service outputs, deontological ethics, substantive rationality, and the rehabilitative ethic. In other words, probation work and its diverse services could be justified by being good and right in themselves. Probation may not reduce reoffending; it may accomplish ‘nothing’. Rather, good for its own sake and operated a good will, which has been relegated to the un-modern. This is the probation ideal, ethic, and aesthetic.

Although there are well rehearsed objections to the rehabilitative ethic that reach back to the 1970s, it complemented the probation ideal. But the collapse of the rehabilitative ethic in conjunction with the probation ideal has created an intellectual and moral vacuum in criminal justice (Bottoms and Preston, 1980; Garland, 1985 and 2001). In fact ‘The collapse of this model exposes us to the moral debate about the values which should be operative in our criminal justice system’ (Wood, 1991: 61 which anticipates Faulkner’s letter of 1993 later). This discussion on the content of moral economy that overlaps with the probation ideal and rehabilitative ethic, asserts that the past was unlike the present morally and intellectually, cognitively and emotionally; things were different then. The jewel that used to shine in Kantian fashion has been cast aside and crushed by the politics of disavowal and relegation into the Real (chapters 3 and 4). When turning from content to argument in support of moral economy, a few general comments to start with.
Supportive Arguments

Whether we like it or not – sometimes we don’t, hell can be other people, we are attracted to and repulsed by the Nietzschean herd, the neighbour as enemy and competitor, and there could be a biological deficiency militating against benevolence (Harari, 2014) - it is difficult to avoid contact with others within the close proximity of family, work place and dole queue, the Joycean street, civil and uncivil society. The argument for moral economy is that it conduces to inter-subjective social relations, promoting the bonds of Durkheimian social solidarity and universality. So, theoretically and empirically, it conduces to self-preservation and is in the enlightened best interests of all of us (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). The weight of evidence suggests that more equal societies almost always do better on a range of social indicators - mental illness and drug use, ill-health and lower life expectancy, obesity, educational performance, including violence, crime, punishment and imprisonment. When confronted with the strength of this evidence the logical implication is to reduce elongated hierarchies, the acme of which is occupied by the elite comptrollers of the material universe. Inequality creates dysfunctional societies through the production of social pathologies rooted in material differences. Of the major economies in Europe none are more unequal than Britain (Piketty, 2014). For Hippodamos, in classical antiquity, the individual achieves happiness and perfection in a group ‘for the individual and the community are coterminous’ (Blumenfeld, 2001: 181). This moral code informed Pauline political ethics with its existential burden to reconstruct the polis. In fact, the political ethics of Romans 12v9 to 13v7 is a manual of moral excellence that ‘connects the individual’s proper end with the collective end’ (Blumenfeld, 2001: 386). This is the Hegelian point that morality appertains to social organisation, not the will to power of atomistic individuals at the expense of others (Plant, 1973).

The argument advanced is that the content of moral economy establishes normative principles, intellectually supported ground rules, that are not only good in themselves but facilitate the good life for all citizens (Aristotle, 2000). There is an ethico-cultural tradition connecting Hippodamos, Aristotle, Pauline ethics, Schweitzer, Wilkinson and Pickett. This tradition includes Küng whose global ethic establishes minimum ‘human values, criteria and basic attitudes’ (1998: 92). It is a matter of wisdom, logic, rationality, and aesthetics to endorse moral economy, in contradistinction to capitalist political economy, as a normative code of virtue by which to get ourselves organized. Klein (2014), from a psychological perspective, argues that living within the circuits of moral economy make us feel better about ourselves. This resonates with Plato’s Republic (1974) where justice (δικαιοσύνη) is beneficial to psychic health. In other words, the just or moral person is happier than the unjust. Additionally, Pinker (2015), a developmental psychologist, has undertaken empirical research that supports the position that the internet age makes us unhappy. It is damaging our social natures, isolating us from each other through pseudo-superficial human contacts and relations. Philosophically, theologically, sociologically, and psychologically, it is better to give than receive, good begets good, and virtue is its own reward. The supporting arguments for moral economy direct our thinking towards political ethics where they were located in classical antiquity. Regardless of moral debates, the diversity of ethical systems, and aetiological questions, it seems a good idea, a matter of practical reason, to consider moral economy as a foundational life-view. To do otherwise is stupid because it detracts from the possibility of human happiness and the good life for all. Put simply, we need each other.
By reflecting on these supportive arguments, the opportunity is presented to move from the world as it is to what it could be. The intellectual resources on morality synthesised in the previous chapter, and the content of and arguments for moral economy under consideration here, offer us half a chance to live together through sharing in the abundance of the world’s material, intellectual, and ethico-cultural resources. Cooperation not barbaric competition make us more rather than less human, leading to growth of refined sensibilities and an enhanced understanding of each other, including criminal behavioural repertoires (Hall, 2012). Of course, the formulation of content and articulation of argument will not convince everyone, easily dismissed as an irrelevant distraction from life’s material priorities and obsession with economic growth. The objection is that the content is unrealistic and supportive arguments unconvincing, passé and unmodern. The Nietzschean Übermensch is contemptuous of virtuous egalitarian neighbourliness and equality. It represents an ethic that degrades the human stock that must be transcended into a higher form of aristocratic life through the will to power. The Nietzschean emphasis is aesthetics not ethics and, as Kenny elucidates, Nietzsche’s ‘ideal human being not only does not love his neighbour: he has no neighbour’ (2010: 939).

We can turn to intellectual considerations of moral economy not only to critique the present but also inform existential decisions about the future. Political, social, and economic organisation should not be reduced to technical specificities, computer modelling, cost-benefit analyses, or risk assessment. From Plato and Aristotle, Paul and Hegel, to Keynes and Piketty, these are intellectual and moral matters that are foundationally required to promote the general welfare over self-interest which has implications for the rationality of criminal justice. The weight of evidence suggests that this has never happened and it is the last thing we want, even after the material crisis of 2007-08. Mumford (1940: 572), berating the limitations of liberalism, stated that ‘universal principles and values give purpose and direction to human life’. Furthermore, Sandel argues that a ‘politics of moral engagement is not only a more inspiring ideal than a politics of avoidance. It is also a more promising basis for a just society’ (2009: 269). From these general comments let’s turn to the specifics of criminal justice.

As with content, so too with argument, the contours of morality operated in the circuits of the criminal justice system, an important (by no means only) source was the probation ideal and rehabilitative ethic. This was a central reproductive and state supported mechanism which is disrupted by applying market-driven concepts to organisational structures that previously transcended market operations. There was a moral dynamic to probation practice exemplified in the dialectics of criminal justice that pursued truth and justice through dialogic argument. There is no political philosophy of left or right, criminological theory, or organisational component of the system – magistrates, judges, clerks, solicitors, barristers, crown prosecution service, police or probation – that can rightfully claim a monopoly on truth and justice. Nevertheless, each organisation with its unique historical formation, professional culture, primary task, and reproductive ethico-cultural mechanisms can combine dialectically to advance different perspectives on the meaning of criminal and social justice. Organisational contestation conduces to negotiated outcomes through contradiction, argument, and sometimes conflict (more so than collapsing differences through reducing cultural divides which terminates in the bland leading the bland; see chapter 3 on the National Offender Management Service). Any justice system that overly relied on prosecution evidence supplied
to magistrates’ and crown court judges from the police and crown prosecution service, would
provoke a serious challenge to truth, justice, and fairness because of what it omitted by being
reductively concerned only with what the offender has done. Equally, to rely solely on a
personalist ideology, social work explanations, respect for persons in some ideal kingdom of
ends, would be rightly challenged by victims and local communities according to the same
demand for truth, justice, and fairness. Consequently, the argument is that both perspectives
are required, what someone has done as well as understanding why. But this delicate balance
has been un-balanced by modernisation from above, excessive political interference, a
permanent revolution of repeated organisational restructuring, the erosion of sociological
analyses and the hollowing out of intellectual and ethico-cultural exploration. This
transformation is contingent upon the decline of the probation ideal, the rehabilitative ethic,
and supporting intellectual and moral arguments. The system has shifted from the dialectics
of negotiated outcomes operating within a contested space, to a reductionist politics of
coercive imposition by the political class for strategic reasons rather than the primary cause
of justice. Thinking about doing justice is structured within political and fiscal parameters, but
it must also be informed by the intellectual and moral resources assembled in chapter 1. If
not then the foundations of criminal and social justice will be undermined, as assuredly they
have been. To do what is just and right self-evidently requires intellectual curiosity and moral
sensibility. Probation was a guarantor of this vital perspective, but no longer because it has
been declared out of time, out of step, and out of sorts with the latest great transformation
of the state. Amartya Sen (2009), invoking Adam Smith (1759/2009), with a trace of Joyce and
Eliot, argues that reasoned and critical scrutiny, to accommodate different intellectual
positions, is a basic requirement for ethical and political conviction. The need to ‘transcend
the limitations of our positional perspectives is important in moral and political philosophy,
and in jurisprudence’ (Sen 2009, 155). Public reasoning, critical discussion, listening to and
learning from others, and assimilating different viewpoints, is central to the intellectual and
moral process of criminal and social justice.

Mode of conceptualisation and articulation

Like Eagleton’s (2014) disquisition on God or Lacan and Žižek on the Symbolic (Big Other),
moral economy is ambiguous, sometimes unrecognisable, betrays a mythical quality, and it
does not readily elicit assent to its entreaties. However, it has the capacity to challenge,
disturb and disrupt behavioural routines and organisational rationalities. It is not part of
nature, or in its nature, to impose itself coercively in the manner of Nietzschean will to power.
Rather, it is subtle in its intimation and invitation through its scattered historical and
contemporary deposits. It takes issue with the way the world is, the images we construct of
the self that reflect and reproduce the neoliberal politico-economic order with its material
signs, status symbols, and all too ephemeral definitions of success. It allows itself to be pushed
out of the world, onto a cross, towards the extremity of the inexplicable Real beyond the
Symbolic. It does not, never has, probably never will, effect a permanent revolution in human
affairs as it is easily deflected and often defeated although never permanently expunged,
again like Eagleton’s God. The crushing weight of history and present arrangements are
stacked against it. Moral economy, like the Pauline politico-ethical state (Blumenfeld, 2001:
389) did not constitute a threat to the Roman Empire, because it operated as a parallel not
usurpatory state, but with the efficacy to be transformative. It disturbs, disarms, and comforts
the human condition, yet it is a paradox because the content of moral economy is not averse
to making an egregious appearance on celebratory state occasions. At the National Service of
Thanksgiving to mark the Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen, in Saint Paul’s Cathedral on Tuesday June 5th 2012, the blessing from the Archbishop of Canterbury enjoined the departing congregation to function within the circuits of moral economy: go forth into the world in peace; be of good courage; hold fast that which is good; render to no one evil for evil; strengthen the fainthearted and support the weak; help the afflicted and honour everyone. Expeditiously, state power vacated the sacred pew to sustain the material platform, as the reproduction of exchange relations continues its relentless march in maintaining inequality and injustice throughout the social structure.

Moral economy is imperceptible and ineffable, but affective, expressive, and sometimes practiced as not all relations between human beings are exchange relations. Hume acknowledged that human beings are not solely motivated by self-interest. There are a thousand instances which are the ‘marks of a general benevolence in human nature’ (1777/1983: 92). Similarly, Smith (1759/2009: 48) endorsed the pleasing social passions of generosity, kindness, and compassion. It should be repeated that moral economy, like political economy, does not intrinsically belong to the structure of the world. It relies on the renewal of existential commitment to its distinctive content and supportive arguments. It can be avoided, we can look the other way, heave our shoulder against it. We can choose an alternative course of action and fill the void at the core of human existence with an alternative symbolic content. There are many competitors clamouring for our attention in the market place of ideological life-styles. But in doing so we must face the consequences of our actions that will inevitably follow. The threads of moral economy, like the veneer of civilization, have a tenuous hold over the human condition and can all too quickly slide into barbarism. It is insecure and impermanent unless defended, advocated, and advanced by all of us in our personal relations, the organisation of the polis, and organisational forms of life that include the criminal justice system.

Schweitzer’s life-view of reverence for life transcended the savage conflict enjoined by the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance of Central Powers in the First World War, but it was not the platform for the post-war reconstruction in Europe, not did it prevent World War Two. However, the intellectual community would profit from re-acquaintance with Civilisation and Ethics (1929). Bonhoeffer’s work on Ethics (1955) did not save the German state or Church in the 1930s, nor did it defeat racism or even prevent his own execution in April 1945, yet his theological and Christological legacy survives to inform thinking about morality in this monograph. The Judaeo-Christian ethic did not transform the Roman Empire of the Caesars. It did not create a new world order based upon a political ethic of agapē, or usher in the Kingdom of God because it ended in ‘defeat’ on a cross. But there are those who conduct their lives according to its code and bear witness to its efficacy to transform existence through immersion in a new Symbolic order. This intellectual, ethico-cultural legacy informs the outputs of Badiou and Žižek. It may not be feasible to imagine a perfect state of moral economy rather than capitalist political economy. It is, however, more feasible to factor the deposits of moral economy into discussions on political organisation to analyse, critique, and to offer alternative perspectives. This will not be a comfortable ride. Furthermore, the content of, arguments for, and the mode of conceptualisation and articulation of moral economy has implications for the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the intellectual resources on morality assembled in chapter 1, and specific attention directed towards the conceptual device of moral economy in chapter 2, must now be put to work.